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FORECASTING NEW ZEALAND CORPORATE FAILURES 2001-10: 
OPPORTUNITY LOST? 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
Knowing whether an organization will fail is useful information for investors and other 
stakeholders.  Looking to 36 New Zealand corporate failures (2001-2010), we find that 
anticipation of their demise was not clearly signalled in the public media.  The question then 
emerges as to whether better forecasts of impending failure could have been derived from 
information that was publicly available at the time.  The aim of this project is to identify the 
potential for having better anticipated these failures, and to consider implications of that found.  
Selecting thirteen indicators and three models from the literature, 25 failing and a matched 25 
non-failing companies are compared using data up to three years prior to failure.  Findings from 
ANOVA and Chi-Square tests reveal a majority of significant differences which grow closer to 
failure dates.  We conclude that while using such information would have revealed indications of 
problems for individual companies, definitive assertions of impending failure would not have 
been justified.  Nonetheless, corporate failure forecasts could have been of benefit to users, as 
long as such forecasts had been qualified as ‘concerns’.     
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Long Abstract 
Those interested in the success of a business may also turn their attention to the possibility of its 
demise; that is, that the organization is not a going concern.  Yet unless there is intention by 
management to cease trading, the usual assumption is that the business will carry on.  Knowing 
whether an organization will fail is useful however, to investors, creditors, employees, suppliers 
and other stakeholders.  If they are aware of its likelihood, forecasts can be adjusted, credit 
acquired, investments curtailed or strategies changed.  
 
 Looking to the corporate failures of 2001-2010, this awareness did not appear to exist in 
sufficient measure.  A review of New Zealand public media (1995-2010) shows that little was 
predicted about these companies’ viability until the year of their liquidation.  The question then 
emerges as to whether better predictions could have been made.   
 
The aim of our project is to identify that potential for earlier discovery of going concern 
problems in New Zealand corporate 2001-2010, and to ask whether publicly-available 
information could have been used to signal going concern problems in these organizations.  
Based on our evaluation of models, ratios and indicators available to the public at the time, we 
assess whether the public good in this respect was served. 
 
Financial information, financial ratios and the growing development of going concern models 
have long been available to assess the likelihood of company failure.  We identify thirteen 
indicators and three models likely to show ‘difference’ between failing and non-failing 
companies.  Thirty-six failed New Zealand companies (2001-2010) are identified, and of these 
25 could be matched to non-failing companies and are tested for the three years prior to 
liquidation.  Indicators, ratios and prediction models are calculated for all 150 financial 
statements, and differences are analysed to determine how well they could have anticipated 
failure. 
 
Findings reveal some significant differences between failing and non-failing companies, which 
grow slightly in number closer to the date of failure.  In particular, the dividend-paid, earnings-
per-share, return-on-assets, current-ratio, net working capital, EBIT and equity ratio as well as 
the Kuruppu, Laswad, Oyelere (2003) model reveal differences. Return-on-equity and the Van 
Peursem Pratt (2002) model show marginally significant differences.  All three years’ data 
combined reveals stronger patterns than years assessed in isolation.   
 
We conclude that while using such patterns would have had merit, it would have been difficult to 
assert confidently as to the future viability of individual organizations.  So while there is some 
evidence of an efficient market for signalling corporate failure, there are conflicting messages as 
well.  Nonetheless, the presence of multiple indicators of concern could have usefully signalled 
‘watchlists’ in which further follow up would have been justified.  That is, corporate failure 
forecasts could have been of benefit to users, as long as such assessments had been properly 
qualified as subjects of ‘concern’ rather than ‘likelihoods of failure’.  Future research could be 
directed toward testing newer models on upcoming data, or examining further as to how the 
media treats this information.   
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Those interested in the success of a business may also turn their attention to the possibility of its 
demise; that is, that the organization is not a going concern.  Yet unless there is intention by 
management to cease trading, the usual assumption is that the business will carry on.  Knowing 
whether an organization will fail is useful however, to investors, creditors, employees, suppliers 
and other stakeholders.  If they are aware of its likelihood, informed decisions can be made: 
forecasts can be adjusted, credit acquired, investments curtailed or strategies changed.   
 
Yet, and despite this, it has been suggested that the individual investor’s interests are not 
uppermost in the mind of analysts (e.g. Malmgran and Styls, 2010).  This is reinforced from what 
has been observed in the market.  In the U.S., six of the ten largest bankruptcies filed in the US 
corporate history, including Enron, WorldCom, and Global Crossing, received unqualified audit 
opinions on their last financial statements filed prior to bankruptcy (Nogler, 2008).  External 
investors were awarded little or no advance warning.   
 
A failure to highlight the potential for failure has had serious consequences for investors in some 
New Zealand companies well.  In the short space of four years 16 finance companies failed, 
leading to a $3.45 Billion loss for public investors (NBR, 2011).  In, for example, the Bridge 
Corp failure up to 18,000 mostly New Zealand investors felt the loss (Agency Fr, 2007).  Costs 
for the failure of South Canterbury Finance, the largest to-date, have yet to be measured.  These 
failures have cost its investors in the billions (Steeman, 2008).  Unfortunately however, and as to 
be revealed further, little was predicted about these companies’ viability until the year of their 
liquidation.  The question then emerges as to whether those sources could have been used to 
anticipate and report these problems more widely and thus to have better served a public good.   
 
BACKGROUND 
 
While auditors provide sometimes influential opinions about a client’s going concern (Blay, 
Geiger & North, 2011), there is little reason to rely solely on them to foreshadow failure.  They 
have exhibited a weak track record.  Recently, for example, client mitigating efforts have been 
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shown to be overly-influential in coming to those opinions (Bruynseels, Knechel & Willekens, 
2011).  According to Venuti (2004), only half of the audit reports for 202 of the 257 publicly-
listed firms that filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in 2001 indicated the auditors’ substantial doubt 
about the entity’s ability to continue as a going concern. A similar situation occurred in New 
Zealand for accounts in 1987 to 1991, where more than a third of the 67 public companies did 
not include any explanatory paragraph or qualification in the auditor’s reports (Pratt, 1992 as 
cited in Van Peursem & Pratt, 2002).  Furthermore, most qualifications were made at or after the 
media had already reported the problems.  Finally, as auditors only need to anticipate failure 12 
months following the issue of the audit report, a long term view is not to be expected from that 
source. 
 
Financial information, financial ratios and the growing development of statistical going concern 
models are available to assess such likelihoods however.  These models were pioneered by 
Beaver in 1966 followed by the widely adopted multivariate discriminant analysis model of 
Altman in 1968 (Bellovary, Giacomino, & Akers, 2006).  Individual ratios and logit models have 
been used as well.  Such models have been shown to reveal some reasonably reliable going 
concern  predictions (Keasy & Watson, 1991; Hall, 2002; Lifschutz & Jacobi, 2010 ).    
 
Given this body of work and the potential to predict corporate failure, we are concerned as to 
why New Zealand company failures were not better anticipated in the public realm.  New 
Zealand has a regulated market and public reporting regime, established regulatory authorities 
and financial advisors, and a respected reputation for ethical practices generally.  Yet a review of 
New Zealand public media (1995-2010)1 shows that little was predicted about these companies’ 
likely viability until liquidation, or tax, proceedings began (e.g. see Slade, 2009).  Reviews ‘after 
the fact’ were conducted (e.g. NBR, 2011; Steeman, 2008), as were broad economic forecasts 
(e.g. NZ Herald, 2008; The Press, 1997; NZ Herald, 2009), but neither individual company nor 
sector viability forecasts were made.  That is, the New Zealand market does not appear to have 
been efficient in terms of recognising impending failure in advance. 
 
                                                             
1  Newztext, Lexis Nexis, 1995-2010 inclusive, using keywords ‘company failure forecast’ and ‘corporate failure 
forecast’. 
5 
 
We are interested as to whether such poor public disclosure is due to a lack of reliable indicators, 
or whether they are available but not sufficiently used or reported.  The aim of our project is to 
identify the potential that existed for earlier discovery of going concern problems in New 
Zealand corporate and listed entities.  Implications of our findings include the possibility that 
more or newer modelling may be needed should the tools that exist not be effective.  
Alternatively, perhaps, research should be directed toward finding out why existing knowledge is 
not being employed for the benefit of New Zealand public investors. 
  
The paper proceeds as follows.  Historical failure prediction models and indicators are identified 
and those seen to be relevant are selected for testing.  The methods are then outlined by which 
failed New Zealand listed companies (2001-2010) and their matching non-failed companies are 
identified and by which information about them is extracted and used for analysis.  Results 
reveal the predictive ‘powers’ of indicators available at the time, and then limitations of the study 
are revealed.  Ultimately, by employing publicly available information and models, we are then 
able to conclude as to whether an informed analysis could have revealed problems up to three 
years prior to failure.  
 
PRIOR RESEARCH 
 
Identifying relevant indicators of failure is the first step of this process, and there is precedent 
from which to choose. An extensive literature on financial distress prediction models has 
emerged since the 1960s and some models have proved to be relatively successful. The earliest 
of these are based in the U.S., pioneered by Beaver’s univariate model in 1966, followed by 
Altman’s multivariate discriminant analysis (MDA) model in 1968. The research by Beaver and 
Altman became two of the most widely-cited models in subsequent studies (Constantinides, 
2002).  
 
Statistical models dominate these studies due to their empirically-proven reliability (Aziz & Dar, 
2006).  Beaver’s (1966) results have provided evidence that ratio analysis can be useful for 
predicting failure for as long as five years prior to bankruptcy.  Multiple Discriminant Analysis 
(MDA) is a commonly-used alternative (Sandin & Porporato, 2007; Altman, 1984). Studies such 
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as those by Altman (1968),  Altman & McGough (1974), Taffler & Tisshaw (1977), Levitan & 
Knoblett (1985),Cormier, Magnan, & Morard,  (1995), Kuruppu, Laswad & Oyelere (2003) have 
demonstrated some reasonable accuracy rates. For example, Altman’s (1968) well known Z-
score model has an overall predictive accuracy rate of 95% up to two years prior to actual failure.  
Taffler &Tisshaw (1977) claim that because such models are less subject to ‘window dressing’ 
by companies , they can be an early signal of going concern problems.  
 
Logistic regression has also become popular.  It was used in an early study by Ohlson (1980) and 
Zmijewski (1984) to predict corporate financial distress.  It is now most widely-employed in the 
field (e.g. Dopuch et al., 1987; Koh, 1991; Cormier et al., 1995; Van Peursem & Pratt, 2002).   
Allen & Chung (1998) and Collins & Green (1982) found that there is no significant difference 
in the predictive accuracies between MDA and Logit/Probit techniques, and Aziz & Dar (2006) 
confirmed that MDA and Logit/Probit models had similar predictive powers and 
misclassification rates. More recent research has also included expert system models, theoretical 
models and hybrid systems (e.g. Charitou, Neophytou, & Charalambous, 2004; Cormier et al., 
1995; Chung, Tan & Holdsworth, 2008) but these developments are in their early stages. 
 
Model Selection  
We anticipate that some models will be more effective predictors of New Zealand corporate 
failure than others.  Most are based on U.S. companies and may not be relevant in New Zealand 
(e.g. see discussion in Aziz & Dar, 2006).   Indeed studies in New Zealand have raised such 
concerns (Ferner & Hamilton, 1987) and some corporate prediction models for New Zealand do 
reveal differences from their overseas counterparts (Trow, 1981; Ling & Matthews, 1982; Tabb 
& Wong, 1983; Bradbury, 1985; and Ferner & Hamilton, 1987).  New Zealand is a small market, 
dominated by a reasonably small manufacturing base (outside primary industry) and may require 
distinct constructs.   
 
Some models have drawn on New Zealand data, such as those from Van Peursem and Pratt 
(2002), Kuruppu, Laswad and Oyelere (2003) and Chung, Tan, and Holdsworth (2008). Chung et 
al (2008) used a neural network technique to find distinctions in the New Zealand market.  It is 
limited to a study of only 10 failed companies however, and was made public toward the end of 
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our period of study, and hence would not have been available for most of these companies’ 
analyses.   
 
Kuruppu, Laswad and Oyelere (2003) identified 12 significant estimators in a discriminant 
analysis.  While they were able to estimate 92% of failed companies, their model suffered from a 
highly conservative Type II error selection correctly classifying only 36% of non-failures. That is, 
64% of ongoing entities were classified as ‘failing’.  Nonetheless, it provides a recent New 
Zealand model.  The Van Peursem and Pratt (2002) logit model was able to identify 92% of both 
failing and non-failing companies and their model was also found to be useful in analysing small, 
non-listed New Zealand entities (Van Peursem and Pratt, 2005), and it may also form a 
reasonable basis for forecasting. 
 
Altman’s (1968) model is also viewed with interest as it is one of the most widely-cited and 
employed in the corporate distress prediction literature (see Lifschutz & Jacobi, 2010).  It brings 
and MDA model into the analysis and, furthermore, there is some evidence of its effectiveness 
‘downunder’ (see Van Peursem & Pratt, 2006).   As a result, we expect that analysts in the first 
decade of this century might have reasonably looked to the Altman (1968), the Kuruppu, Laswad 
and Oyelere (2003) model and to the Van Peursem and Pratt (2002) models for predictive power.  
Individual ratios found to be significant in overseas studies are also of interest.  
 
Ratio selection 
Some have questioned the strict mathematical requirements imposed by the models (Sandin & 
Porporato, 2007; Ohlson, 1980). For this reason, analysts could have also looked to ratios and 
other single indicators of performance.  They are available and comprehensible to most readers. 
 
Ratios measuring profitability, financial leverage and liquidity appear repeatedly in this literature. 
Profitability ratios including net income/total assets, earnings before interest and tax (EBIT)/total 
assets, sales/total assets, retained earnings/total assets, profit before tax/current liabilities, and 
return on assets have been successfully incorporated into models (Altman, 1968; Zmijewski, 
1984; Altman & McGough, 1974; Altman, Haldeman, & Narayanan, 1977; Ferner & Hamilton, 
1987; Koh, 1991; Taffler & Tisshaw, 1977). The earnings before interest and tax/total assets 
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ratio has the highest discriminating ability among the five ratios used in Altman’s (1968) model.  
Of profitability ratios available generally, ‘return on assets’, ‘profit margin’ and ‘earnings per 
share’ seem to be commonly employed in this literature and are thus used here. 
 
Others find financial leverage ratios to drive results (Levitan & Knoblett, 1985; Beaver, 1966; 
Altman & McGough, 1974). Firms that are experiencing financial difficulties tend to have 
problems in generating sufficient cash flows to meet their short-term debt obligations.  Over-
leveraging is seen to have been a problem in New Zealand (NBR, 2011) and so employing ratios 
to do with leverage would seem to be a reasonable step for local analysts to adopt.  ‘Debt to 
equity’ ‘equity’ (equity to assets) ‘return on equity’ and ‘interest coverage’ ratios are thus tested. 
 
Liquidity ratios are also significant to bankruptcy prediction (Beaver, 1966; Taffler & Tisshaw, 
1977; Levitan & Knoblett, 1985; Altman, 1968; Kuruppu et al., 2003; Lenard, Alam, Booth & 
Madey, 2001). Working capital/total assets ratio is found to be the most common among the 
liquidity ratios used in Altman’s and Beaver’s studies (Altman, 1968; Beaver, 1966).   Beaver 
(1966) also introduced the value of cash-flow models to the prediction literature, claiming that 
they “offer much promise for providing ratio analysis with a unified framework” (p.79).  
Individual financial variables used in this analysis derive therefore from this range of findings 
including ‘net working capital’ and the ‘current ratio’.   
 
From the efficient market literature, it is assumed that “financial market variables efficiently 
incorporate expectations, and should, therefore, be good ‘lead indicators’ of future events” 
(Keasey & Watson, 1991, p.96; also see Ohlson, 1980 and Beaver, 1968).  Efforts have also been 
directed toward determining whether audit fees are related to solvency, though this is 
unconfirmed (Stanley, 2011).  Looking to stock prices and related indicators were common in the 
latter decades of the 20th century however (e.g. Dopuch et al., 1987; Altman et al., 1977; Zavgren 
et al., 1988; Foster, 1986).  ‘Earnings per share’ is applied here as it is likely to receive the 
attention of investment analysts.   Furthermore, it is one test of market efficiency; that is, 
whether the market anticipates company failure. 
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Company accounting data are susceptible to manipulations, especially when a firm is having 
financial difficulties.  That is, managers would be inclined to ‘manage’ known failure predictors 
to improve their apparent position.  Qualitative variables may be less subject to such 
susceptibilities.  Research by Lenard et al. (2001) and Cormier et al. (1995) for example have 
incorporated dividend payout, corporate governance quality, debt defaults, auditor characteristics 
and investment activities based on their predictive strength found in prior research (e.g. Lennox, 
1999; LaSalle, Anandarajan, & Miller, 1996; Mutchler, Hopwood & McKeown, 1997).    
‘Dividend paid’, ‘Audit Qualification’ and ‘Audited by Big4’ are nominal variables employed 
for this purpose and would be available in New Zealand public databases. 
 
Ideally, we could have introduced yet further measures indicative of impending corporate failure.   
Corporate governance quality is implicated in some New Zealand failures (NBR, 2011), but 
quality is difficult to ‘know’.  In New Zealand, several former ministers and publicly-honoured 
directors have been implicated in a recent finance company failures (see Hawkins, 2012 on 
Lombard Finance).  Information collated by the tax division (Inland Revenue or IRD) could have 
been a valuable indice as well, as the IRD was said to be the force behind some of the 
liquidations (Slade, 2009); but privacy laws may have prevented the most meaningful 
information coming out in time for investors to have been able to respond.   
 
In the end, we employ 13 ratios which we believe were both available and comprehensible to 
most analysts, and which have a known history of success.  This is in addition to the three 
models selected for reasons discussed in the previous section.  It is suggested that, given these 
indicators, the interested analyst might have been able to highlight impending failure.  Our 
expectation is that significant differences between failing and non-failing companies will emerge 
for all of these indicators one year prior, and up to three years prior, to their actual failure; 
differences that would have sent a clear message to analysts about the susceptibility of what were 
ultimately to become failing concerns. 
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METHOD  
 
Failing New Zealand listed companies are classified as those which are in receivership, those 
which have liquidated or those which are in the process of liquidating.  This criteria conforms 
with understandings of failing companies generally (e.g. Altman, 1968; Beaver, 1966; Chung et 
al., 2008; Kuruppu et al., 2003; Van Peursem & Pratt, 2002; Taffler & Tisshaw, 1977).  We 
avoid therefore companies that are ‘only’ legally bankrupt or companies that have only delisted 
for reasons unknown (e.g. see Altman, 1968; Ferner & Hamilton, 1987).  While including them 
would result in a larger frame (sample and population), they may not all have actually ‘failed’ in 
terms of having wound up and ceased trading.  Thus only non-recovered entities last listed on the 
New Zealand Exchange (NZX) between 2001 and 2010 are classified as ‘failing’.   
 
The NZX Company Research and NZ Companies Office website offer the best publicly-
available information on New Zealand listed companies and are therefore used.   The sample of 
failed firms is taken from the list of delisted companies on the NZX Company Research database 
which does not include firms delisted due to restructuring, takeover or merger.  The time period 
studied (2001 to 2010, inclusive) was chosen because it is relevant for the current business and 
economic conditions. It is recent, and represents a period of time over which significant failures 
occurred.  Some (e.g. Altman, 1968; Chung et al., 2008) acknowledge that the choice of a long 
time period (in this case, ten years) may not be desirable due to changing industry trends, 
however as New Zealand’s financial market is small, a longer period is needed to collect a 
reasonable sample.  To respond to this concern, companies that delisted after mid-2008 are ‘held 
out’ of a second analysis, and comparisons are then conducted on the remaining matched pairs.  
This is done to determine effects of the economy slump that began in 2008, if any, on the 
predictive strength of ratios, models and nominal indicators. 
 
The exact liquidation date for the delisted companies is sourced in the New Zealand Companies 
Office website, and is the date on which either the receiver or liquidator was first appointed.  
Financial statements for up to three years prior to their liquidation date are from the NZX 
Company Research or from the Companies Office database.  A three year window was chosen as 
information prior to that for a number of the companies was of lesser quality or not available.   
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Non-failing New Zealand or, where there was no close match, Australian listed companies were 
matched to failing companies on industry, principal business activity and company size 
(operating revenue per annum) to control for these variables. The principal line of business as 
well as total asset size of each failed firm is that set of annual reports just prior to the date of 
failure.   The original 36 failing companies are reduced to 25 due to the difficulty in matching 
compatible companies or due to questions about the reasons for their delisting. 
 
The paired-sample design method is chosen to control for the potential for distinguishing 
characteristics of industry and size found in this literature (e.g. Beaver, 1966; Altman, 1968;  
Altman et al., 1977; Koh, 1991; Cormier et al., 1995; Chung et al., 2008).  In this case, matching 
also reduces industry bias that could occur by over- or under-representation of one or more 
existing sectors.  As New Zealand is a very small market, it does not allow for single-industry 
analysis.  Using all major sizes and categories of New Zealand company – including the NZAX 
small market exchange -- does however allow us to obtain a New Zealand-representative sample.   
 
Non-failed firms are selected and matched to failed companies stratified by industry, principal 
business activities and company size (i.e. total asset size). The industry categories used to match 
the companies are from the NZX Company Research classification, which make the pairing 
process more convenient as the non-failed firms were already grouped according to industry.  
The final list of failed and matched firms selected is listed in the Appendix.  The three failure 
prediction models are applied to all 150 financial statements for all fifty companies over the 
three years. The Altman (1968) calculation is in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. Altman’s Z-score model. 
 
Z = 0.012X₁ + 0.014X₂ + 0.033X₃ + 0.006X₄ + 0.999X₅ 
 
where  X₁ = Working capital/Total assets 
X₂ = Retained Earnings/Total assets 
X₃ = Earnings before interest and taxes/Total assets 
X₄ = Market value equity/Book value of total debt 
X₅ = Net Sales/Total assets 
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As apparent, failure prediction likelihood in the ALTMAN model is driven by a positive net 
sales relative to assets.  In contrast, the the VAN PEURSEM-PRATT model demonstrates a 
stronger presence of imbalance between equity and debt (negative financial leverage) (Figure 2).    
 
Figure 2. Van Peursem & Pratt’s New Zealand company failure model. 
 
   1.2 – 6.8x(FL) + 2.1x (STA) + 0.1 x (ROA) + 0.1 x (TA)* 
Where:  FL = financial leverage 
STA = Sales/ Total Assets 
ROA = Return on assets 
TA = Total Assets/100,000 
 
* Coefficients ‘rounded’ for publication, Financial Leverage calculated from profit after tax divided by equity before preference shares 
 
The Kuruppu, Laswad and Oyelere (2003) model, favouring earnings, income and asset 
contributions to prediction, is shown in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3:  Kuruppu, Laswad and Oyelere (2003) failure prediction model  
 
-2.786 +3.298(STA) -3.920(QAS) +.163(CACL) -2.671(TAAA) +5.030(NIA) +3.654(TLTA) -
.119(NIS) +.023(WCA) +.005(SAR) -.002(SWC) -.425(NIL) +1.727(STA) 
 
Where:   STA= Total sales/ Total tangible assets 
               QAS= Quick assets/ total assets 
               CACL= Current assets/ Current liabilities 
               TAAA= Total assets/ average total assets 
               NIA  = Net income/ average total assets  
               TLTA = Total liabilities/ total assets 
               NIS = Net income/ shareholders funds 
               WCA = Working capital/ total sales 
               SAR = Sales/ average accounts receivable 
               SWC = Sales/ average working capital 
               NIL = Net income/ total liabilities               
               STA = Shareholders funds/ total assets 
 
 
The financial statements for first year prior to failure are essentially those filed in the last full 
year that financial statements were prepared. The second year before failure is defined as the 
fiscal year preceding the first reporting period prior to failure and the same definition goes for 
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the third year. The financial statements for non-failed companies is also collected for the same 
fiscal years as that of their assigned failed firms from the same databases. For example, if a 
company failed in 2006, the available financial statements prepared three years prior to failure 
would include the financial period ending in 2005, 2004 and 2003. The financial statements 
collected are organised and grouped accordingly.   A combination of ANOVA (ratio data) and 
Chi Square (nominal data) tests are used to compare the effectiveness of each indicator applied 
to this current data.   
 
RESULTS  
 
Results are as to individual ratio measures of performance, nominal measures employed and the 
Altman (1968), Kuruppu, Laswad and Oyelere (2003) and Van Peursem-Pratt (2002) models.   
Descriptive statistics (excluding the two nominal variables) can be found in Table 1.  
 
 INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
The significance of these differences can be found in Table 2. 
 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
Significant results (>95% confidence) are more prominent where all three years of data are used 
in combination.  This is also the case for the two elements that approach significance (>90% 
confidence).  As to individual ratios, only EARNINGS PER SHARE and ratio EARNINGS 
BEFORE INTEREST AND TAXES (EBIT) are significant on a year-by-year basis, and neither 
of the two, neither show a particular pattern over time.  The EBIT is the only measure indicating 
differences in all three years.  EARNINGS PER SHARE is also observed in individual years, but 
only in years 1 and 3.  The CURRENT RATIO is marginally significant in year 2 only, and 
RETURN ON EQUITY is marginally significant in year 3 only.  As to nominal measures, all 
those tested show significance (Table 3). 
 INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
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Thus nominal indicators are important in years preceding liquidation.  DIVIDEND PAID, for 
example, is one of only two that show significance in all three years prior to failure; AUDIT 
FIRM shows significance the year prior to liquidation.  AUDIT QUALIFICATION is both a 
significant indicator in the two most recent years prior to failure, and together with PROFIT 
MARGIN and EQUITY RATIO, are the only indicators that reveal patterns (not always 
significant) of growing problems over time.    
We note however that, even in the final year prior to liquidation, less than half of the failing 
companies had any form of audit qualification or emphasis (of matter)2.  So the ‘audit opinion’ is 
shown to be a weak indicator of impending failure in these cases. 
Failure prediction models 
The KURUPPU-OYELERE-LASWAD model showed significant differences when all years are 
combined and in year two, and the VAN PEURSEM-PRATT model approaches significance in 
the three-years combined category.  From the ALTMAN (1968) model, companies are predicted 
to be bankrupt if Z ≤ 2.675 and non-bankrupt if Z > 2.675.   From Table 4 it is apparent that 
Altman’s Z-score model correctly classified all failed companies except no. 8 and 23.  The 
model only correctly classified three non-failed companies however revealing that conservative 
bias.  Oddly, three bankrupt firms (company no. 8, 13 and 23) actually have higher Z-scores than 
their matched non-failed firms.  Differences between failed and non-failed companies, using the 
Altman model, are not surprisingly therefore insignificant (Table 4).    
 
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
The VAN PEURSEM-PRATT (2002) model measures likelihood on a ratio scale; the likelihood 
of failure is greater when the numbers are smaller (and negative).  On the face of it, this model 
performs better than Altman’s model as it has distinguished a greater number of failures (Table 
5). This is confirmed in ANOVA scores (Table 2) which shows results approaching significance 
(90% confidence or greater) in the direction expected, but only when the three years as-a-whole 
are assessed, perhaps due to the precision achieved from the greater numbers.   
                                                             
2  Eleven of the failing companies had a going concern qualification one year prior to failure, eight two years prior 
to failure and three three years prior to failure.  Some non-failing companies also had qualifications. 
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 INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
 
The KURUPPU LASWAD OYELERE (2003) model performed well two years prior to failure 
(with significant differences, Table 2) and in combination, a finding apparently driven by the 
strong Year 2 results as neither Year 1 nor Year 3 approached significance (Table 6). 
 
INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE  
 
This is thus the strongest result of the three models tested.  Whether ‘managed’ accounts 
interfered with these results is not known.  We do test to see however whether the global 
financial crisis of 2008 had an effect. 
 
Global crises effects 
As the global financial crises of 2008 also affected New Zealand, we took measures to determine 
whether this extreme change in market conditions skewed or otherwise had an effect on the 
predictability of these events overall.  The effects are illustrated in Table 7. 
 
INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE 
 
Only five of the 25 failed companies tested failed in the periods of time following mid-2008.  
Nonetheless, removing them reveals some small changes to our results.  Firstly, the DEBT-
EQUITY ratio becomes significant (or marginally significant, see Table 6) on removing these 
recent corporate failures.  Also the EQUITY ratio’s significance declined from having 
‘approached’ significance (n=25) to non-significant (n=20).  Finally, the strength of the findings 
with respect to the ROEQUITY and CURRENT RATIO was reduced on testing them with a 
smaller sample size.  No changes, other than DEBT-EQUITY, were in unexpected directions 
however, and no other differences changed the nature of their significance to the model generally.   
 
The increase in the predictive value of the DEBT-EQUITY ratio in the year prior to failure  with 
n=20 is of note because it is more significant despite it being from a smaller sample (n=20).  We 
also note that all five ‘removed’ companies (and their matching non-failing companies) are from 
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either the Investment or Property industries, sectors which appeared to both rely more heavily on 
debt than elsewhere.  It is possible therefore that their contribution may have skewed the n=25 
outcome.  This leads us to suggest the possibility of ‘industry’ differences, which may be worthy 
of further exploration.  Nonetheless, and with respect to the matter of concern here, the post- 
2008 situation does not appear to be one that would have interfered with an analysis of 
impending corporate failure.   
 
LIMITATIONS 
 
This investigation does not attempt to re-examine the accuracy or reliability of failure prediction 
models developed under different sets of data so no suggestion is made as to the superiority of 
one model over another.  The relatively small size of our database, limited by the population 
from which it is drawn, may have had other and unidentified ‘significant differences’ that were 
not identified due to the reduced precision that a small sample provides.   
 
Robertson and Mills (1991) point out that it is inappropriate to apply a model outside the 
industry from which it was derived.  Our findings with respect to the Property and Investment 
industry, and their apparent influence on the DEBT-EQUITY relationships, indicate that industry 
distinctions may exist.  Yet, without the population for a sound statistical comparison, those 
questions must be left up to other methods to determine.    
 
Some final financial statements were not reported for a full twelve-month period, particularly 
where they failed mid-year, such as Blue Chip Financial Solutions (9 months) and VTL Group 
(14 months). The financial data of these few companies were extrapolated up (if more than six 
months) or down (if less) to obtain 12-month data equivalence.  This assumed that it would have 
followed a similar pattern therefore if it had completed the year.     
 
We do not know the effect of ‘creative accounting’ where manipulation of the accounts may 
have occurred and distorted the ‘true and fair’ nature of some of the figures.  So for example, 
leadership of four of the failing companies in the finance sector data – South Canterbury finance, 
Blue Chip, Bridgecorp and Capital+ Merchant Finance – have all been charged with fraud 
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following the liquidation of the firms (e.g. see Nippert, 2012).   Nonetheless, insofar as we are 
testing the strength of publicly-available information, this is not necessarily a disadvantage for 
our purposes but simply is part of that public information, however weak.  The presence of 
‘managed’ information may however have reduced the precision of the models or ratios, and 
may help explain some of the anomalies found.   
 
DISCUSSION 
 
The purpose of this project is to identify that potential for making an earlier public forecast of 
going concern problems in New Zealand corporate and listed entities that failed, 2001-2010.  The 
aim is to understand whether better information about impending failure could have been 
provided to the public.  The research proceeds by applying known ratios and models to 
information available to the public and as derived from their published annual reports.  Twenty-
five failing and twenty-five non-failing companies for all three years prior to failure are matched 
by industry, activity and size, analysed for going concern susceptibility and compared to 
determine whether failing companies would have presented a different picture than non-failing 
companies.  The results suggest that there were significant differences that could have been 
identified.  Whether such differences could, or should, have been ‘discovered’ by analysts at the 
time, and publicised, is the question to which we now turn.  
 
Individual year data fails to present a distinct picture of these failing companies.  At the level of 
the year-by-year analysis, only two ratios are found to be significant, both to do with ‘earnings’, 
EARNINGS PER SHARE and EBIT, two and three years prior to failure respectively.  The only 
model to show significant difference is the KURUPPU LASWAD OYELERE model, and then 
only in the second year prior to failure and in combination.  Given the individual indicator results, 
it appears that the accumulation of earnings over time is the measure most powerfully indicative 
of company failure in these 2001-2010 company failures.  The dominance of ‘assets’ in the 
KURUPPU LASWAD OYELERE model however indicates its importance as well.   
 
More significant results are found when more data, and over a longer period of time, is supplied; 
essentially when three years of data are combined.  Using all 150 sets of financial statements 
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therefore, which consist of the 50 matched companies over the three years prior to failure and not 
distinguished by year, six significant differences emerge.  These are:  EARNINGS PER SHARE, 
RETURN ON ASSETS, CURRENT RATIO, NET WORKING CAPITAL, the KURUPPU 
LASWAD OYELERE model and EQUITY AND EBIT.   Earnings figures, yet again, are a 
common element in many of the individual ratios found to be significant.   
 
Furthermore, at the three-years-combined level, two more approach significance (>90%): 
RETURN ON EQUITY and the VAN PEURSEM-PRATT model.  The latter relies heavily on a 
debt-to-equity ratio, and a closer look reveals the sort of situation it tended to tag as a ‘failing 
company’ situation.  One example is Austral Pacific Energy Limited in which the total equity 
plunged from $12 million to -$3 million in the two years before failure, whereas total liabilities 
rose from $3.5 million to $66 million in three years.   
 
In combination therefore seven (54%) ratios, including model outputs, showed significance and 
nine (69%) were at or approached significance when combining all three years.  This picture 
distinguishing failing companies is improved yet further on considering the three nominal 
indicators, all of which are found to be significant.  A failure to pay (DIVIDEND PAID) is 
associated with liquidation in each of the three years prior to failure.  The use of a major firm 
(AUDIT FIRM) is also significant, but only closer to the date of failure.  AUDIT 
QUALIFICATION is one of the most consistent predictors within two years of failure, perhaps 
due to the auditor’s closeness to and expertise about the company taken as a whole.  Overall 
therefore, and using combined data, 12 of 16 or 75% of measures used indicated significance 
differences between failing and non-failing companies.  This would seem to go some way toward 
distinguishing entities most under stress.  In those terms therefore, there appears to be some 
efficiency to the market of indicators of failure and, had analysts looked to and reported on them, 
the results might have signalled appropriate concerns. 
 
There is nothing to indicate that such notice occurred however.  From our review of the media at 
the time, it was not apparent that any of the New Zealand major publications signalled advanced 
and likely failure of individual companies.  Forecasts focussed on macro-economic issues, and 
reviews – where done – were on a summary of past experiences:  All too late or too vague for 
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investors to manage their situation.  There is little evidence that existing models or ratios were 
brought together in a way that could have thus informed pubic forecasts of failure.   
 
Nonetheless, even if such analysis had occurred prior to the global crisis, it has to be said that to 
have published individual business forecasts on that basis would have been risky.  The signals 
are not unambiguous, there is some clouding of indicators.  For example, we anticipated that 
indicators from the year prior-to-failure would be more revealing than those produced two-years 
prior.  For the most part, this did not occur.  We also expected indicators two years prior to 
failure to be more revealing than those three years prior to failure.  Nor did this occur with any 
consistency.  Except for the EQUITY RATIO (which approached significance in year 1) and the 
AUDIT QUALIFICATION finding, results were generally stable over time.  The EARNINGS 
PER SHARE ratio signalled problems one- and three- years prior to failure, and the AUDIT 
QUALIFICATION signal was consistent.  Nonetheless, there was no overwhelmingly-
convincing pattern of failure.   
 
Of the three models, two gave measurable indications of impending corporate failure.  The 
KURUPPU-LASWAD-OYELERE model sent a strong signal, but only in year 2 and this was 
not at all reinforced from findings in years 1 and 3.  The VAN PEURSEM-PRATT model sent a 
strong signal, but only in combining the data of all three years.  The ALTMAN model 
demonstrated no significant difference between failing and non-failed firms.  Furthermore, and 
given the conservative bias of such models -- the ALTMAN model here in particular -- 
indications of ‘failure’ may have been justifiably taken with some level of caution.   
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
From these findings we come to conclude on several points.  The first is related to the fact that 
most significant results tend to emerge when all three years of available data was combined.  It 
would be presumptuous therefore to tag poor performance on the basis of one year’s findings, or 
based on a pattern from one year to the next.  Nor did the most recent statements unequivocally 
demonstrate the more dire situations these businesses were in.  We do not know why this 
occurred, but it may be that financial statements were more likely to be distorted by desperate 
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managers in the last dying days of a business.  For there to have been a clear indication of failure, 
then it seems that a pattern of events-in-total-and over-time needs to occur for an accurate picture 
to emerge.  Furthermore, if an organization is not in the practice of distributing dividends -- such 
as would have occurred in partnerships, high growth or closely-held companies -- one of the 
strongest indicators of failure would have disappeared from the analysis entirely.   
 
A greater level of consistency, and clearer patterns over time as problems grew, may have made 
it easier therefore to identify approaching fiscal disasters.  That is while individual analysts, in 
using these indicators, may have found reasons for concern, the measures were not such that they 
would have found comfort in making public and potentially litigious forecasts about a 
company’s future on their basis alone.   
 
Nonetheless, the signals that emerged could have served a purpose.  That the models proved to 
be conservative is relevant to this end, because such conservatism is an advantage from a users’ 
analysis point of view.  If analysis is used to identify ‘concerns’ as opposed to labelling actual 
‘failures’, the ratios and models worked well.  Findings may have justified a follow up on tagged 
accounts and while this would increase the investigation time and costs (given the likelihood of 
Type II errors), it would not have resulted in a high fail-to-identify likelihood (Type I error).  
Using these models in this way would have identified most companies in trouble, and a lot of 
continuing ones as well; but at least the likelihood of ignoring poor-performing companies would 
have been quite small.   
 
We conclude therefore that while observing patterns in industry over time and using such 
patterns to evaluate particular organizations within it would have had merit, it would have been 
difficult to assert as to the future viability of these organizations solely on the basis of publicly-
available financial information alone.  There is some evidence of an efficient market for 
signalling corporate failure, signals must be followed up to uncover the full stories.   
 
It would thus seem that the presence of multiple indicators of concern could have signalled risky 
situations.  It is in this where progress could potentially be achieved in the future.  It would seem 
that the presence of multiple or significant indicators of impending failure could have allowed 
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analysts to identify the most high-risk organizations, a ‘watchlist’ if you will.  Owners could 
have placed pressure on managers, risk margins may have been more aptly incorporated into 
share prices.  Where indicators raised concerns about declining revenues or rising debt, pressures 
to examine availability to capital, the reliability of customer and supply bases or its revenue 
forecasts could have been expanded.  That is, corporate failure forecasts could have been created, 
and could have been of benefit to users, as long as they had been properly qualified as subjects of 
‘concern’ rather than ‘likelihoods of failure’.   
 
As to implications for industry, it would seem that there is justification in suggesting that ratio 
and model analysis to identify failing companies is potentially informative.  Applying it may not 
provide definitive answers of likely company failure, but would provide analysts with a reason to 
focus on organizations which show higher risks of forced liquidation. 
 
FURTHER RESEARCH  
 
It would be of value to develop ways in which follow up can be conducted on companies tagged 
as having potential going concern problems.   Also developing or testing existing models against 
yet further data as time goes on, such as the Chung et al (2008) model, would help toward 
identifying their strength and adding to the base of information by which analysts can use 
publicly-available information.   
 
It will also be useful to extend the prediction horizon by looking into financial statements earlier 
than the three year period in order to examine and identify when exactly the performance of 
firms begin to deteriorate, causing the firm to eventually go into liquidation or receivership.    
 
Finally, a study of media discourse might reveal how or whether more subtle flags of concern 
were, or were not, raised about the problems of these failing companies.  Such studies could help 
the media inform, and the investors ‘interpret’, their market and messages sent about it.  Also, 
exploring the legal implications of such disclosure would be of interest to determine the frame to 
which such disclosures are limited. 
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Appendix:  Failing and Non-failing company descriptive information 
Company name Type¹ Total asset size ($ 000) Industry Liquidation Date Years Analysed 
      Blue Chip Financial Solutions Limited F 109686 Finance & Other Services 14/9/2006 2005-2003 
Dorchester Pacific Limited N 390642 Finance & Other Services - 2005-2003 
Feltex Carpets Limited F 276222 Textiles & Apparel 13/12/2006 2005-2003 
Cavelier Corpation Limited N 147827 Textiles & Apparel - 2005-2003 
Bridgecorp Limited F 652287 Finance & Other Services 29/8/ 2007 2006-2004 
Insured Group Limited N 202276 Finance & Other Services - 2006-2004 
Austral Pacific Energy Limited F 62732 Mining 12/1/2010 2007-2005 
New Zealand Oil and Gas Limited N 266599 Mining - 2007-2005 
Capital+Merchant Finance Limited F 232137 Finance & Other Services 15/12/2009 2007-2005 
New Zealand Finance Holdings Limited N 198975 Finance & Other Services - 2007-2005 
E-Force Limited F 3705 Forestry & Forest Products 20/3/2001 2000-1998 
Fletcher Challenge Forests Limited N 2561000 Forestry & Forest Products - 2000-1998 
FinMedia Limited F 14496 Investment 28/10/2005 2004-2002 
Rubicon Limited N 247914 Investment - 2004-2002 
GDC Communications Limited F 13652 Media & Telecommunications 12/10/2006 2004-2002 
Telecom Corporation of New Zealand Limited N 7500 Media & Telecommunications - 2004-2002 
ICP Biotechnology Limited F 21447 Investment 12/6/2008 2007-2005 
BLIS Technologies Limited N 916 Investment - 2007-2005 
Manor Inns Group Limited F 28287 Leisure & Tourism 22/2/2001 2000-1998 
Millenium & Copthorne Hotels Plc N 2649.1 Leisure & Tourism - 2000-1998 
Plus SMS Holdings Limited F 11229 NZAX  11/6/2009 2008-2006 
Zintel Group Limited N 16012 NZAX  - 2008-2006 
Property Leaders Australia & New Zealand Limited F 30166 Property 24/8/2001 2001-1999 
The National Property Trust N 111092 Property - 2001-1999 
Property Leaders Australia Limited F 20448 Property 24/8/2001 2001-1999 
Property for Industry Limited N 214768 Property - 2001-1999 
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ProvencoCadmus Limited F 162495 Intermediate & Durables 3/8/2009 2008-2006 
Smartpay Limited N 14526 Intermediate & Durables - 2008-2006 
Roller International Limited F 1738 Leisure & Tourism 2/2/2001 1999-1997 
Tourism Holdings Limited N 172632 Leisure & Tourism - 1999-1997 
Seafresh New Zealand Limited F 9577 Agriculture & Fishing 9/9/2002 2001-1999 
Sanford Limited N 486521 Agriculture & Fishing - 2001-1999 
Submarines Australasia Limited F 6 Leisure & Tourism 16/7/2003 2004,2002,2001² 
New Zealand Experience Limited N 9060 Leisure & Tourism - 2003-2001 
OPI New Zealand Limited F 362144 Investment 15/9/2009 2007-2005 
Pyne Gould Corporation Limited N 1444174 Finance & Other Services* - 2007-2005 
Botry-Zen Limited F 2435 NZAX  23/12/2009 2009-2007 
Pacific Edge Biotechnology Limited N 896 Investment* - 2009-2007 
Cabletalk Group Limited F 10895 Media & Telecommunications 18/2/2009 2008-2006 
TeamTalk Limited N 59331 Media & Telecommunications - 2008-2006 
Eastern Hi Fi Group Limited F 6347 NZAX  14/1/2010 2008-2006 
Renaissance Corporation Limited N 46918 Consumer* - 2008-2006 
CL Realisation Limited F 72285 Textiles & Apparel 4/8/2009 2007-2005 
Hallenstein Glasson Holdings Limited N 85263 Consumer* - 2007-2005 
BD NZ Limited F 9683 Media & Telecommunications 29/3/2010 2008-2006 
Sky Network Television Limited N 1834656 Media & Telecommunications - 2008-2006 
Propertyfinance Group Limited F 107449 NZAX  31/5/2010 2009-2007 
Geneva Finance Limited  N 111513 NZAX  - 2009-2007 
VTL Group Limited F 33663 Consumer 5/11/2008 2007-2005 
Fisher & Paykel Appliances Holdings Limited N 1227990 Intermediate & Durables* - 2007-2005 
 
 
¹ F denotes failed company while N denotes non-failing company. 
² Financial statements for period ending 2003 not available. 
* Matched company is from a different industry as the failed company. 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics for ratios 
 
  Prof 
Margi
n 
Earn 
Per 
Share 
RO 
Assets 
RO 
Equity 
Curr 
Rati
o 
Net 
Wkg  
Cap 
Debt/ 
Equity 
Equity 
Ratio 
Interest 
Cover 
Altma
n 
Model 
VP-
Pratt  
Model 
Kuruppu 
Laswad 
Oyelere 
EBIT 
 
1 
Failed 
Company 
Mean -1.06 -.34 -.26 -.52 1.89 2801 4.11 15.91 -69.41 .85 -32.79 103.15 -1443.80 
Std. 
Dev 
1.95 13.99 .40 1.64 3.12 46858 13.28 83.30 469.21 .96 88.61 439.56 30278.72 
NonFailed 
Company 
Mean -.30 12.92 .81 -.06 2.99 83651 2.17 46.10 -14.16 .89 -10.27 -38.85 32510.92 
Std. 
Dev 
2.38 14.35 4.20 .55 4.66 26097
0 
2.72 27.81 129.08 1.01 18.01 94.54 51175.59 
 
2 
Failed 
Company 
Mean -2.91 -.80 -.14 -.34 1.13 8088 5.98 32.89 173.00 .86 -39.00 3.42 4792.37 
Std. 
Dev 
7.50 4.90 .32 1.09 .52 27200 15.75 34.19 2004.65 .95 110.76 45.05 17583.26 
NonFailed 
Company 
Mean -13.54 9.30 .70 -.28 5.66 72514 3.85 46.54 -29.72 .81 -25.10 -45.17 35090.01 
Std. 
Dev 
63.87 38.39 3.90 1.17 13.67 22739
0 
11.67 28.39 196.61 1.06 81.68 106.27 57683.79 
 
3 
Failed 
Company 
Mean -1.36 -1.87 -.11 -.03 2.04 14079 6.98 40.03 -2378.84 .90 -97.04 -8.85 3628.12 
Std. 
Dev 
5.73 7.43 .29 .62 2.49 45656 14.87 30.18 11524.7
4 
1.15 294.27 81.85 14069.97 
NonFailed 
Company 
Mean -.97 13.76 .77 .38 4.28 96423 1.83 56.10 -98.72 .95 -9.47 -43.88 29828.25 
Std. 
Dev 
5.42 18.52 3.47 .85 8.01 27085
8 
4.12 104.21 500.03 1.11 29.62 125.74 44061.27 
 
A
v. 
Failed 
Company 
Mean -1.76 -.63 -.17 -.29 1.71 8379 5.62 30.20 -757.38 .87 -56.59 28.33 2366.69 
Std. 
Dev 
5.55 9.93 .34 1.18 2.32 40347 14.44 54.91 6766.87 1.01 189.28 260.99 21520.18 
NonFailed 
Company 
Mean -4.94 11.99 .76 .01 4.31 84196 2.62 49.58 -47.53 .88 -15.01 -43.78 32476.39 
Std. 
Dev 
37.04 25.69 3.82 .92 9.47 25049
6 
7.27 63.69 316.86 1.05 51.35 105.973 50624.78 
29 
 
Table 2: ANOVA Results  
** Signficance (95%)  
* Approaching significance (90%) 
 
 
 
 
 
          
 
                        
  
3 years combined 
(n=150) 1 year prior to failure 2 years prior to failure 3 years prior to fai3lure 
  
F-
Statistic Sig.   
F-
Statistic Sig.   
F-
Statistic Sig.   
F-
Statistic Sig.   
Profit Margin 0.526 0.469   1.500 0.227   0.683 0.413   0.032 0.859   
Earnings/share 15.948 0.000 ** 10.949 0.002 ** 1.701 0.198   12.707 0.001 ** 
Return on assets 4.425 0.037 ** 1.220 0.209   1.147 0.290   1.593 0.213   
Return on equity 3.063 0.082 * 1.716 0.196   0.038 0.846   3.831 0.056 * 
Current Ratio 5.320 0.022 ** 0.920 0.341   2.745 0.104   1.737 0.194   
Net working capital 6.784 0.010 ** 2.325 0.134   1.979 0.166   2.342 0.132   
Debt to equity 2.595 0.109   0.510 0.478   0.296 0.589   2.598 0.113   
Equity ratio 4.013 0.047 ** 2.955 0.092 * 2.357 0.131   0.478 0.492   
Interest coverage 0.824 0.366   0.322 0.573   0.253 0.617   0.935 0.338   
Altman Model 0.007 0.934   0.018 0.895   0.025 0.876   0.024 0.877   
Van Peursem-Pratt 
Model 3.326 0.070 * 1.489 0.229   0.255 0.616   2.192 0.145   
Kuruppu et al Model 4.923 .028 ** 2.494 .121 
 
4.430 .041 ** 1.363 .249 
 EBIT 22.725 0.000 ** 8.152 0.006 ** 6.31 0.015 ** 8.304 0.006 ** 
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Table 3:  Chi Square Results for nominal 
data 
  
3 years combined 
(n=150) 1 year prior to failure 2 years prior to failure 3 years prior to failure 
  Value 
Pearson 
Chi-
Square (2-
side)   Value 
Pearson 
Chi-
Square 
(2-side)   Value 
Pearson 
Chi-
Square 
(2-side)   Value 
Pearson 
Chi-
Square 
(2-side)   
Dividend Paid 17.37 0.000 ** 8.333 0.004 ** 5.195 0.023 ** 4.04 0.036 ** 
Audit Firm 13.83 0.003 ** 8.314 0.04 ** 5.419 0.144   3.739 0.154   
Audit Qualification/ 
EOM 10.92 .001 ** 7.714 .005 ** 5.242 .073 * 1.358 .244 
 ** Significant to 95%. Confidence  *Significant to 90% confidence 
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Table 4 Descriptive Statistics: Altman’s model score 
Pair no. 
Year before failure 
1 2 3 1 2 3 
Failed Non-failed 
       1 0.592 0.518 1.048 0.226 0.211 0.210 
2 1.093 1.271 1.226 1.419 1.548 1.691 
3 0.170 0.177 0.172 0.140 -0.776 0.136 
4 0.125 0.051 0.223 0.078 0.073 0.210 
5 0.148 0.142 0.136 0.224 0.191 0.202 
6 1.221 1.780 1.300 0.250 0.242 0.203 
7 0.489 0.447 0.287 0.346 0.324 0.426 
8 3.353 2.510 2.178 0.730 0.679 0.675 
9 0.123 0.032 0.224 0.680 0.683 0.917 
10 0.164 0.158 0.211 0.303 0.183 0.236 
11 0.498 0.052 0.022 2.376 2.720 2.992 
12 0.714 0.525 0.726 0.072 0.098 0.112 
13 1.564 2.125 3.692 0.120 0.102 0.117 
14 0.986 1.209 1.464 2.834 3.354 3.868 
15 0.505 1.896 0.336 0.977 0.602 0.722 
16 0.452 0.605 0.793 0.744 0.777 0.913 
17 -0.054 0.021 0.025 1.088 0.764 0.849 
18 0.129 0.094 0.087 0.144 0.210 0.339 
19 0.191 0.211 0.043 0.606 0.216 0.387 
20 0.662 0.486 0.548 0.520 0.443 0.681 
21 1.522 1.657 1.367 4.048 3.305 3.561 
22 1.672 1.633 1.733 2.401 2.438 2.533 
23 3.790 3.497 4.505 0.373 0.361 0.314 
24 0.083 0.137 0.026 0.358 0.293 0.236 
25 0.770 0.253 0.284 1.162 1.228 1.178 
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Table 5 Descriptive statistics: Van Peursem & Pratt model score 
Pair No. 
Year before failure 
1 2 3 1 2 3 
Failed Non-failed 
       1 -20.9 -22.6 -10.9 -62.3 -72.2 -73.0 
2 -12.7 -9.4 -93.8 -5.0 -2.1 -1.1 
3 -43.9 -41.2 -50.5 -53.9 11.5 -2.2 
4 141.9 -12.6 -0.1 -1.7 0.0 1.1 
5 -129.6 -130.9 -130.3 -57.1 -40.1 -33.2 
6 -2.5 -12.2 -17.6 -1.1 -2.7 -3.0 
7 1.0 -5.2 -0.7 1.4 1.4 1.2 
8 -1.2 -1.8 -3.9 -14.3 -21.3 -34.1 
9 25.9 22.5 20.5 -4.5 -0.9 0.9 
10 -358.1 -65.3 -36.9 -2.7 -3.1 -2.2 
11 -1.3 -2.7 -2.5 2.2 2.2 2.7 
12 1.3 1.3 1.3 -4.9 -3.9 -2.9 
13 1.4 1.4 1.3 -1.2 -2.7 -0.6 
14 -11.9 -6.2 -6.3 -3.8 -2.9 46.7 
15 -61.8 1.7 -4.4 -2.7 -6.4 -5.5 
16 -4.9 -0.4 -0.7 1.7 2.0 2.4 
17 1.2 -20.6 -0.3 2.6 0.2 0.4 
18 -166.8 -126.7 -142.1 -33.9 -31.1 -34.4 
19 -109.8 -6.4 -2.6 -15.8 -1.0 13.3 
20 103.8 -5.1 -2.1 -9.5 -9.0 -0.9 
21 -36.3 -0.6 -0.8 -5.2 -10.2 -8.9 
22 -17.0 85.7 -12.0 4.0 4.1 4.3 
23 3.7 -0.4 -7.8 -0.1 -0.5 -1.0 
24 41.8 -524.8 -489.7 -31.5 -408.5 -109.5 
25 11.6 -92.5 -154.2 -1.1 -0.2 0.3 
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Table 6 Descriptive statistics:  Kuruppu, Laswad, Oyelere model 
 
Pair No. 
Year before failure 
1 2 3 1 2 3 
Failed Non-failed 
       1 -32.3 -14.3 52.7 -52.5 -43.1 -29.3 
2 -28.8 -41.0 -25.9 -14.7 -25.3 -21.7 
3 -92.8 -111.3 -71.0 -38.6 125.7 9.0 
4 90 30.6 .8 -22.2 -2.1 .3 
5 -46.6 -28.1 -24.8 -21.9 -24.1 -9.7 
6 8.6 3.1 7.9 -176.6 -175.6 -79.3 
7 * -1.1 -5.6 .6 -4.6 -10.1 
8 11.2 -.9 17.4 -2.2 -2.6 -.9 
9 66.0 19.4 17.1 39.7 32.8 16.5 
10 158.3 8.8 -352.2 -.9 -.8 -.7 
11 13.7 10.7 10.7 -4.5 -4.2 -4.9 
12 -10.7 -2.3 -7.5 -40.2 -281 -25.6 
13 -11.8 -3.9 -10.2 -8.1 -10.0 -357.8 
14 68.5 -2.6 -11.3 10.1 3.4 2.7 
15 3.4 -.9 -1.3 -44.0 -24.8 -32.3 
16 37.4 103.6 -3.3 -27.6 -121.8 -127.6 
17 165.4 165.4 167.3 -2.3 -26.2 -.3 
18 -68.5 -31.6 -13.8 -2.6 -7.1 -22.3 
19 13.0 16.2 15.1 30.7 4.9 66.6 
20 3.0 -5.2 -7.5 -19.8 -12.6 -8.8 
21 6.9 -.7 -1.3 -4.7 -9.9 -12.7 
22 2.9 36.1 21.6 -27.1 -25.9 -21.3 
23 .1 2.8 8.2 -445.1 -407.1 -481.8 
24 29.2 -9.2 -14.9 -.2 8.36 2.8 
25 2193.8 -47.7 1.0 -96.5 -95.8 -92.6 
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Table 7: Pre- and Post- 2008 comparison: Combined and one-year prior       
  3 years combined (n=150) 1 year prior to failure 
  Combined (n=25) Pre-2008 (n=20) Combined (n=25) Pre-2008 (n=20) 
  
F-
Statistic Sig.   
F-
Statistic Sig.   
F-
Statistic Sig.   
F-
Statistic Sig.   
Profit Margin 0.526 0.469   0.435 0.511   1.500 0.227   0.163 0.689   
Earnings per 
share 15.948 0.000 ** 30.263 0.000 
 
10.949 0.002 ** 7.819 0.008 
 Return on 
assets 4.425 0.037 ** 4.479 0.036 
 
1.220 0.209 
 
1.483 0.231 
 Return on 
equity 3.063 0.082 * 2.511 0.116 ₁ 1.716 0.196 
 
1.354 0.252 
 Current Ratio 5.320 0.022 ** 3.305 0.072 ₁ 0.920 0.341 
 
0.758 0.389 
 Net working 
capital 6.784 0.010 ** 6.397 0.013 
 
2.325 0.134 
 
2.332 0.135 
 Debt to equity 2.595 0.109 
 
4.176 0.043 ₁ 0.510 0.478 
 
3.448 0.071 ₁ 
Equity ratio 4.013 0.047 ** 4.761 0.031 
 
2.955 0.092 * 1.312 0.259 ₁ 
Interest 
coverage 0.824 0.366 
 
1.24 0.268 
 
0.322 0.573 
 
0.929 0.341 
 Altman Model₂ 0.007 0.934 
 
0.17 0.681 
 
0.018 0.895 
 
0.163 0.689 
 Van Peursem 
Pratt Model₂ 3.326 0.070 * 3.157 0.078 
 
1.489 0.229 
 
1.609 0.212 
 Earnings before 
interest-tax 22.725 0.000 ** 17.802 0.000   8.152 0.006 ** 6.504 0.015   
₁  Changed significance of original finding      ₂ On model outcomes 
 
